Al-Shabaab’s Prospects in Ethiopia: Challenges and Limitations

In 2024, arrests and disruptions linked to al-Shabaab in Ethiopia have raised fears of the group’s potential expansion. Although Ethiopia faces internal conflicts that weaken its government, factors like clan animosities and ineffective propaganda limit al-Shabaab’s prospects. Historical context shows al-Shabaab’s struggles to gain a foothold in Ethiopia, despite its activity in neighboring countries.

Recent reports indicate that there have been multiple arrests of al-Shabaab militants, the disbandment of terrorist networks, and the interception of weapon supplies in Ethiopia during 2024. These developments have raised concerns regarding al-Shabaab’s ambition to establish a significant presence in Ethiopia, similar to its operations in Kenya. The Somali jihadist organization has a history of targeting civilians and security forces in Kenya, with notable incidents such as the 2013 Nairobi mall attack and the 2015 public university assault, which were spurred by Kenya’s military actions in Somalia following instances of al-Shabaab aggression.

Ethiopia’s apprehension is compounded by historical precedence, where weakened governments have often witnessed the rise of jihadist groups, as evidenced in the cases of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam waal-Muslimeen in Mali and Burkina Faso. However, the opinions of analysts, including myself, suggest that despite the perceived weakness of the Ethiopian government under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, al-Shabaab is unlikely to gain substantial ground within the country. While armed conflicts, particularly the Tigray war and ongoing strife in the Amhara and Oromia regions, have indeed strained Ethiopia’s military, the environment may only permit minor terrorist activities rather than a robust insurgency.

Two critical factors hinder al-Shabaab’s potential for expansion in Ethiopia: first, historical clan conflicts, especially between the Ogadeen clan of Ethiopia’s Somali region and al-Shabaab, limit the group’s acceptance among local populations. These animosities trace back to disputes over control of Kismayo port several years ago. Second, al-Shabaab’s ineffective propaganda strategies fail to resonate with potential supporters in Ethiopia. In contrast to its messaging in Kenya, which targets specific minorities, al-Shabaab presents a uniform narrative portraying all Ethiopians as adversaries, alienating potential allies among Ethiopia’s diverse Muslim groups.

Despite its operational capacity, estimated between 7,000 to 12,000 militants and its initial roots in Ethiopia’s Somali region, al-Shabaab has struggled to launch successful attacks in the country. Attempts to ingratiate itself with the ethnic Somali population have been thwarted by longstanding grievances with the Ogadeen clan. Although al-Shabaab has garnered some support among Oromo fighters, they do not enjoy the same recognition as foreign fighters from Kenya.

The group’s propaganda efforts play a significant role in shaping perceptions; however, its portrayal of Ethiopians as mere antagonists fails to account for the complex social and ethnic dynamics at play. This approach undermines any potential collaboration from other Muslim ethnicities, notably the Oromo, who make up a significant portion of Ethiopia’s population.

Consequently, while Ethiopia’s political and military conditions present challenges, they do not facilitate an environment conducive to al-Shabaab’s expansion. The group has yet to formulate effective strategies in response to Ethiopia’s vulnerabilities. Until such strategies are in place, it is improbable that al-Shabaab will establish a dominant foothold in the country.

The discussions surrounding al-Shabaab’s presence in Ethiopia come after multiple incidents involving the arrests of its members and the disruption of its networks along with arms interceptions. Concerns have been fueled by the group’s actions in neighboring nations, notably its violent campaign in Kenya, thus prompting fears of a similar trajectory in Ethiopia. Historical context reveals Ethiopia’s military struggles, particularly due to internal conflicts, leading to speculation about the potential for jihadist groups to exploit the political instability. However, a critical analysis provides clarity on the unique factors that may limit al-Shabaab’s influence in the region.

In summary, despite Ethiopia’s contemporary challenges, including internal conflicts and a weakened military, the potential for an extensive al-Shabaab expansion remains limited. Historical clan conflicts, especially with the Ogadeen clan, along with the group’s ineffective propaganda highlighting overly simplistic narratives, serve as barriers to al-Shabaab’s success in the region. Therefore, while small-scale terrorist activities may occur, a significant operational presence by al-Shabaab in Ethiopia seems unlikely at this juncture.

Original Source: theconversation.com